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A POLITICAL AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
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Abstract
This essay is motivated by an interest in a particular aspect of
Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia’s foreign policy has been called
upon to serve the goals of national development. The national
development takes place within a regional and global environment.
Indonesia’s most immediate environment is the sub-region of
Southeast Asia, and for that reason the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), which remains the cornerstone of
Indonesian foreign policy.
ASEAN Community is a continuing process. It will continue to
promote the expansion and then deepening of the implementation of
ASEAN Community Blueprints beyond 2015. ASEAN Community
Vision 2025 was approved and signed at ASEAN Summit Meeting,
21 – 22 November 2015 in Kualalumpur, Malaysia. In the mean time
for Indonesia itself, there are some impediments in the implementation
of Indonesia’s maritime nexus will continue to hedge against the
ASEAN Economic Community as well as the major powers interests,
especially with RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership led by ASEAN but heavily influence by China and the
Trans Pacific Partnership that once led by the United States of
America and seems abandon in Donald Trump era.
The study reveals that he strategic implication of the above
possible development appeals the need of new approaches to
Indonesia. Some basic assumptions can be derived from the
foregoing examination of Indonesian foreign policy concepts, a
changing Asian strategic environment, and uncertainties of
interdependence. It may be reasonable to assume that Indonesia
has the capability to increasingly strengthen linkages among
defense, security, and foreign policy aspects which leads to an
adequate Indonesian national security policy.
Key words: foreign policy, Indonesia, ASEAN Community, strategic
implication.
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ASEAN Community Vision 2025
ASEAN Community is a continuing process. It will continue to
promote the expansion and then deepening of the implementation
of ASEAN Community beyond 2015. ASEAN Community Vision
2025 was approved and signed at ASEAN Summit Meeting, 21 –
22 November 2015 in Kualalumpur, Malaysia. Along the summit,
there other documents that have been approved, which are the
Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead
Together; ASEAN Community Vision 2025; and Blueprint of APSC,
AEC, and ASCC 2016 – 2025 (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2015).
In the ASEAN Blueprint, it contains the second road map of
ASEAN Community (2016 – 2025), which is directed to make
ASEAN as a more peace, stable, economically integrated, outward
looking, people centred, people driven, and people oriented region
in the next ten years of ASEAN community building process. To
realize those vision, the ASEAN member state leaders have agreed
to put more attention on development cooperation with priorities
on the adoption of aspirational goals to double the regional GDP
and halve the regional poverty by 2025 and the development of
Post-MDG's, the development of the Second Generation
Partnership, and the development of Indo-Pacific Wide Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (Liow, 2014).
The development of ASEAN Vision 2025 needs to stand over
agreed principles. Some of the principles are very classic to ASEAN
like continuing the creation of a peaceful and stable ASEAN,
promoting prosperity with equity, people centered, people oriented,
increasing ASEAN’s stance in the global community of nations,
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reaffirm enhanced commitment for the maintenance of peace,
security, and stability, which is in the regional and global interests
(Asean Secretariat, 2017). However, those principles always got
challenges with regional security issues like South China Sea
disputes and Rohingya refugees. Therefore, the ASEAN Vision
2025 will need more concrete guidance in their implementations.
Although it may be hard to set up practical guidance, but
ASEAN at minimum should further maintaining the stance as
peace-loving nations and strengthening peace oriented values
through, inter alia, respect for universally recognised principles of
international law, and upholding the principle of moderation (The
Asean Secretariat, 2013). In the case of resolving disputes, ASEAN
should use peaceful means including through dialogue and
consultations. The peaceful means should always be interpreted
of renunciation of the threat or use of force and in accordance with
universally recognised principles of international law. ASEAN
should address any disputes by enhancing dialogue and
cooperation to promote the rule of law, good governance,
democracy, and human rights; and strengthening cooperation on
disaster management, UN Peacekeeping Operations, non-
proliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism, transnational
crime and maritime security, among others (ASEAN Regional
Forum, 2018).
In the 2015 ASEAN Summit, all the ASEAN members also
agreed to deepening and expanding the implementation of ASEAN
Community Blueprints. Furthermore, there are some continuing
efforts in the field of regional economic cooperation within ASEAN
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Economic Community framework to obtain prosperity in the region
among others and developing economic resilience. Economic
resilience gain substantial attentions, especially when the region
got hit by monetary crisis in 1997-1998 and global financial crisis
in 2008.
Some of policies to leverage regional economic resilience have
been investigated.  Deepening of the bilateral currencies swap
arrangement was discussed among ASEAN major players to
reduce the impact of exchange rate turmoil, especially from the US
Dollar. As for food security, ASEAN has even gone further by
optimizing the ASEAN Plus Three engagements with CMIM and
APTER. In energy security, ASEAN has made initiatives in
constructing of an ASEAN Power Grid (APG) in 1997 and a Trans-
ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) in 2000. Those three policies would
become the security net for ASEAN in facing the most scared crisis:
monetary, food and energy (Puja, 2015).
However, another layer of security should be built to leverage
the regional economic power. ASEAN should foster the
development of regional economy by implementing Master Plan of
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC). That connectivity will stimulate and
grow more businesses. Supported by ASEAN-led trading block of
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the
ASEAN’s economy should be maintained in high economic growth
at the average of 5,3 – 6% and even aspire to double the combined
GDP (OECD Development Center, 2018).
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ASEAN: The Cornerstone of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy
Indonesia’s foreign policy has been called upon to serve the goals
of national development. The national development takes place
within a regional and global environment. Indonesia’s most
immediate environment is the sub-region of Southeast Asia, and
for that reason the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), which remains the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign
policy.2
Within  ASEAN, Indonesia pressed on for regional political,
economic, and cultural cooperation, emphasising the importance
of national and regional resilience. Over four decades, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been the
cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. Utilising goodwill and
cooperation from its immediate neighbours, Indonesia benefited
from external assistance, foreign investment and inflow of
managerial skills which it distinctly lacked. From being a regional
recalcitrant in the mid-1960s, Indonesia became the prime mover
of regional peace making.
At the same time, Indonesia steadfastly maintained the need to
strive for regional stability and resilience: the 1971 ZOPFAN (Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) concept, the 1976 ASEAN Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord
were made regional benchmarks, reflecting Indonesia's vision of
regional self-reliance. At the January 1992 ASEAN summit,
Indonesia was set on projecting a more prominent role within the
2 Its original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei
joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
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ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA),3 and in-the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF).4
Indonesia now plays a more active role in regional politics,
economics and security. Towards a closer interaction with
countries in East Asian region, Indonesia, through ASEAN has
developed ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process involving China, Japan
and South Korea. ASEAN promotes dialogue with Europe through
the Asian-Europe Meetings (ASEM).5
From the point of view of Indonesia's political importance within
ASEAN, it is vitally important that Indonesia reassert itself as the
anchor and the leader of ASEAN, which is still very relevant in the
field of politics and conventional security and can moderate
political and security disagreements among members. The
organisation remains a hope of countries in the Southeast Asia.
ASEAN can be expected again to serve as driving force in the world
economy.
Moreover, multilateralism in the regional context has
proven its utility as evinced by the successful establishment
3Since January 2003 AFTA has been implemented in six ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, and Philippine). They decreased trade tariff from 0
to 5 per cent based on the scheme of Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).
4 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, first held in July
1994 in Bangkok, Thailand. The ten ASEAN states today are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Philippine, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and
Dialogue partners are the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the European Union,
Australia, New Zealand, China, India, and Russia. Other countries are observers.
For ASEAN, the key to the ARF's raison d'etre is in dialogue to "avoid the potential for regional
conflicts in the Asia Pacific." ASEAN members emphasise that the ARF aimed to build
“mutual confidence, preserve stability and ensure growth in the Asia-Pacific by creating a
network of constructive relationship.”
5ASEM, which was first held in Thailand in 1996, is a biennial informal meeting of heads of state
and government of 10 Asian countries and 16 EU member states, including the president of
the European Commission. In order to facilitate cooperation in various fields, finance,
economic and foreign ministers meet annually.
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and consolidation of ASEAN. Today under the forum of ASEAN,
Indonesia and the other members are presently engaged in
promoting a transformation of the region to be a prosperous
Southeast Asia region through the building of ASEAN Community
which is people oriented, people centred, and people driven.
So far ASEAN has been the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign
policy. In spite of its shortcomings and without in the least
overlooking them, Indonesia’s perception of national and regional
stability is closely linked with the nature of her relationship with
her immediate neighbours. Here lies the strategic significance of
ASEAN (Anwar, 1994).
Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Joko Widodo
Indonesia’s foreign policy, like that of any other country, is shaped
by various factors such as the nation’s history, geographic
conditions, demography, security  and national interest. These
factors prompted Indonesia to adopt a foreign policy that is
independent and active, as espoused in 1948 by Mohammad
Hatta, then Indonesia’s Vice President.
Indonesia’s Independent and Active Foreign Policy is not about
being “neutral“ or taking “equidistant” positions on international
issues, nor is it a policy of “neglecting” or “ignoring” developments
in world affairs. The word “independent” means that Indonesia
alone will decide and determine its own position on world issues
without external pressures or influence. The word “active” means
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that Indonesia is committed to participating in constructive efforts
that help build and maintain a just and peaceful world.
Being part of the Asian and the Pacific theatre, Indonesia
considers relations with Asian and Pacific nations are part of
paramount importance, especially with those in the Southeast
Asian and Asia-Pacific regions. In this context Indonesia will take
part in any collective effort leading towards the creation of a
climate which is conducive for the initiation of cooperative
ventures between countries of above mentioned regions.
The Southeast Asian and the Pacific region is in the innermost
circle of the concentric circle on which Indonesia patterned its
priorities in international relations. In fact, the two regions are
mentioned “in one breath” in the Guidelines of State Policy
formula. Being the direct environment of Indonesia, it is only
natural that priority is given to those regions of which Indonesia is
an integral part. This innermost circle is followed immediately by
the next comprising Asia and the Pacific, then follow the circles
comprising other areas of the globe.
Juxtaposed to the concentric circles defined region-wise are
the concentric circles forum-wise, starting with ASEAN as the
innermost and the United Nations (UN) as the outermost circles,
with in-between the circles comprising forums such as the Islamic
Conference Organization (ICO), the Non-Aligned Movement, APEC,
and other such groupings in which Indonesia participates.
The concentric circles mentioned above should not be
understood as a rigid and fixed way of patterning Indonesia’s
foreign policy. Trends and events of the international scene may
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have an impact on Indonesia’s national interest, or may provide
for Indonesia an opportunity to assume a special role. In this
regard, the above mentioned concentric circles should be perceived
as oscillating circles as well. Oscillating as it may, the order of
circles remains as Indonesia’s ground-work for international role-
taking and posturing.
Concerning with the Indonesian current government under
President Joko Widodo, the performance of the Indonesian foreign
policy has changed. Today Indonesia focuses on its efforts to be a
great maritime country in the region. Jokowi’s first foreign policy
speech was made before world leaders attending the East Asia
Summit, Myanmar, November 13, 2014. They are so called as five
pillars of Jokowi’s Global Maritime Nexus Doctrine. First, rebuild
Indonesia’s maritime culture. As a country consisting of 17,000
islands, Indonesia should be aware of and see the oceans as part
of the nation's identity, its prosperity and its future are determined
by how we manage the oceans. Second, maintain and manage
marine resources. With focus on building marine food sovereignty
through the development of the fishing industry. Third, provide
priority to the development of maritime infrastructure and
connectivity. By constructing sea highways along the shore of
Java, establish deep seaports and logistical networks as well as
developing the shipping industry and maritime tourism. Fourth,
maritime diplomacy. Indonesia invites other nations to cooperate
in the marine field and eliminate the source of conflicts at sea,
such as illegal fishing, violations of sovereignty, territorial
disputes, piracy and marine pollution. Fifth, to develop maritime
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defense forces. This is necessary not only to maintain maritime
sovereignty and wealth, but also as a form of our responsibility to
maintain the safety of shipping and maritime security (Witular,
2014).
Hegemonic Competition in the Southeast Asia Region
There are some impediments in the implementation of Jokowi’s
maritime doctrine for the next three years ahead in the region. It is
well known that Indonesia’s global maritime nexus will continue to
hedge against the ASEAN Economic Community as well as the major
powers interests, especially with RCEP. The US has continued to
recognize Southeast Asia region as an area of critical importance.
Strategically, Southeast Asia constitutes part of the US forward
line of defense against a potential attack from across the Pacific.
Southeast Asia is a critical component in a series of strategic
interests that extend from the Persian Gulf to the West coast of the
US. Guam is host to strategically vital US air and naval bases,
which are Washington’s largest military installations outside the
US. Together with bases in Japan, South Korea, Australia and
Hawaii, they serve as a reminder of US military presence in the
western pacific, as a deterrent to conflict and reassurance to allies
and friendly governments, and as a forward defense of American
territories in the Pacific. It also provides a means of projecting
military force into the Indian Ocean.
As the Asia-Pacific is emerging as the future epicenter of global
economic and political power, so is ASEAN seen to be ascending
as a regional force in Asian regionalism (Tickner & O. Waever,
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2009, p. 122). In this respect the crucial countries whose program
designs will tend to influence American relations with ASEAN is
China. China is the only great powers that borders on Southeast
Asia. Due to this geographical proximity, Southeast Asia looms
large in Beijing security considerations. The countries bordering
its southwestern provinces – namely, Vietnam, Laos, and
Myanmar— may create assumed or real threats to China’s security
on its frontiers (Fifield, 1977, p. 309).
It is only natural that as a great power, China, has taken the
great interest in Southeast Asia’s regional development. In so far
as its security interests, the Chinese do not wish to see hostile or
potentially hostile power assume direct or indirect control of its
neighbors. China has therefore continuously opposed any
assumption of dominance in the region by any other major powers,
especially if such a position could pose a potential threat to its
security (Fifield, 1977, p. 309).
Despite China’s attempts to cultivate close relations with the
ASEAN states through maritime silk road, some of these countries
still harbored suspicion of China’s intention due to their historical
experience with the Chinese Communist Party’s continued ties to
their local communist parties supporters. At the same time, the
diminishing presence of the US following the end of the Vietnam
War, the improved relations between China and ASEAN, and
ASEAN’s growing economic importance have prompted the United
States to forge stronger economic and political ties with Southeast
Asian countries. This is probably one of the main factors that has
led to recent the United States attempts to help resolve the South
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China Sea dispute as well as its involvement in East Asia Summit
(EAS).6
However, with respect to the projection of the US regional
security challenges for the Indo-Pacific Region in 2020 with a focus
on South East Asia, it is assumed to give more attention on the
dispute settlement of South China Sea (SCS) conflict.7 It should be
much aware of the great economic potential of the economic and
strategic value of the disputed maritime territory. As a result,
whoever controls the South China Sea will be in a position to
influence development in adjacent countries. The attainment of
the resourceful and strategic SCS territories would entail an
enhanced growth of the economies and status of these countries
(McDougall, 1997).
The SCS is not an interest only of the claimants – China,
Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan – but also
everyone else who uses the sea lanes for merchant vessels to pass
through. However of notable developments in the SCS is the
antagonizing involvement of two great powers i.e. China and the
U.S within the region which has become a situation in which East
Asian nations themselves have to face another thorny issue.
The U.S have reiterated shifting to the Asia Pacific and its
concern regarding the rise of China. Of course the US interest here
is not only about resolving dispute peacefully, but it is also a well-
known fact that the U.S would like to maintain its traditional
foothold within the Asian region. As a result the U.S has
6 East Asia Summit members are 10 countries of ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, India, USA, and Russia.
7 The claimants states of SCS are China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.
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strategically partnered with some ASEAN countries to achieve its
goal. But China already has more influence in ASEAN than the U.S
has. Take for example China’s huge stack of investment in
Southeast Asian countries.
China has long been involved in the region more than the U.S
but even now as the U.S tries to make a come-back some ASEAN
states are supporting its move to balance China’s rise and
influence. Vietnam and U.S relations are improving with more
positive prospects for the future, but at the same time Vietnam is
neighbor to China and has been greatly influenced by China,
particularly in its political system. This issue is a real headache
for the Vietnam leadership because they do not want to provoke
China by openly allying with the U.S an ‘arch-enemy’ of China on
the subject of the SCS dispute. The U.S and China may be
portraying a picture of rivals yet in the process they may actually
be dividing the resourceful SCS between themselves. After all, only
they are equipped enough to exploit the resources. The U.S could
exploit on behalf of its ASEAN partners but with more to gain for
itself whilst China exploits within its already claimed territories (A.
Bader, 2014).
New regional reality is that the regional is witnessing the return
of U.S. and China military presence and reach out at regional
scale. Without careful and clear policy, it can pose new danger to
the already volatile world. At this point ASEAN member states are
left in a crux of a dilemma when one takes into account the U.S-
Sino rivalry within the region. In regards to the SCS dispute, even
though ASEAN countries turn to the U.S for strategic reassurance,
Dinamika Global | Volume 03 | No. 02 | Desember 2018
148
they do so in full knowledge that their economic future depends
on closer cooperation with a booming China.
Yet it is unfortunate that action-wise ASEAN can do little about
the Sino-American current dispute, it would be devastated by a
trade war. An undeniable fact is that ASEAN does need the U.S
influence and a strong military as a form of defense mechanism
(Medcalf, 2013). At the same time ASEAN needs China’s economic
momentum to survive. In facing the geo-political and geo-strategic
development in the region Indonesia needs a clear, synergic, and
comprehensive grand strategy in the framework of US and China
diplomacy while remains to keep the ASEAN centrality or ASEAN
led process in the Southeast Asia region (Richards, 2014; Hiebert,
2013).
Strategic Implication
The above possible development appeals the need of new
approaches to Indonesia. Some basic assumptions can be derived
from the foregoing examination of Indonesian foreign policy
concepts, a changing Asian strategic environment, and
uncertainties of interdependence. It may be reasonable to assume
that Indonesia has the capability to increasingly strengthen
linkages among defense, security, and foreign policy aspects which
leads to   an adequate Indonesian national security policy. In
addition, it would be in such an attempt that an appreciative local
government collaboration all over Indonesia would be forthcoming
in facing ASEAN Vision 2025. Indonesia is a big country with 34
provinces, 412 regencies, 93 cities, 6994 municipalities, 8309
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districts, and 72994 villages (Ministry of Internal Affairs Republic
of Indonesia, 2015).
All parties in this country should go hand in hand to involve
in the ASEAN Community action line. The consequences of
interdependence include a sharing of the responsibilities of
regional leadership supported by ASEAN partners. Indonesia is
already consulting jointly other states will become part of this
strategic engagement. The effect of this collaboration, and on
future cooperation, is still challenging.
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